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ABSTRACT:
This essay examines Article 7 of the CISG, the provision on the
Convention‟s interpretation, through the lenses of both German and
English law in order to shed light on interpretative issues in which
there are divergent views in common law and civil law systems. The
essay further provides possible reasons for the non-ratification of
the CISG by the UK in contrast to its broad acceptance in Germany.
The author more closely examines the issue of good faith as a principle of contract law, its vagueness being one of the possible reasons
for the reluctance to ratify the CISG in England. The essay will
conclude with an outlook on current and future efforts to harmonize
contract law in Europe, notably with regards to the new (Draft)
Common Frame of Reference. The question raised is whether the
Common Frame of Reference has a chance of being accepted by the
European civil law countries as well as by England and Wales as
common law jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
“Companies doing business in Europe presently have to deal
with 25 different jurisdictions.”1 In the German newspaper Handelsblatt, Germany‟s former chancellor Gerhard Schröder explained in an article that legal diversity in Europe is one of the
obstacles to the efficient functioning of the European Union‟s single market in particular and to economic growth generally in Europe. While this observation is fairly accurate, it should be kept
in mind that a small part of contract law: the law of sales, is close
to being harmonized not only in Europe, but also worldwide.
The harmonization of international sales law is largely due to
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (“CISG”),2 which today is the most successful and
noteworthy result of the process of unification of international
contract law.3 It has gained worldwide acceptance4 and has been
adopted by seventy-two states,5 including most major trading nations. However, in Europe there is still a flaw in the idea of a uniform sales law; not all European Union (“EU”) states have ratified
the CISG. The most important European non-member is the
United Kingdom (“UK”).6 Other EU states that have not yet ratified the CISG are Ireland, Portugal, and Malta. The non1 Gerhard Schröder, Sieben Chancen für mehr Wachstum in Europa [Seven
Chances for More Growth in Europe], HANDELSBLATT (F.R.G), Oct. 26, 2005, at 5
(emphasis added), official text available at http://www.handelsblatt.
com/politik/deutschland/sieben-chancen-fuer-mehr-wachstum-in-europa;8093 71.
2 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671, available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu [hereinafter “CISG” or “the Convention”].
3 See Peter Huber, Comparative Sales Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 937, 939 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Mathias Reimann eds.,
2006).
4 See Peter Schlechtriem, Introduction to COMMENTARY ON THE UN
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 1 (Peter Schlechtriem
& Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2006).
5 See Status 1980: United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.h
tml (the most recent accessions are of Japan, July 1, 2008, and Lebanon, Nov.
21, 2008).
6 See Ulrich Magnus, Action Plan for a European Contract Law-European
Contract Law and CISG, pt. I, § 2, at 1 n.8, available at http://ec. europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/stakehold-ers/535.pdf.
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ratification of the CISG by the UK is of great significance to the
EU because the contracting states of the CISG within the EU include some of the UK‟s major trading partners7 such as Germany,
France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Italy.
Part I of this essay focuses on the UK‟s non-ratification of the
CISG and tries to identify and analyze some general differences
between the common law system of England and Wales and civil
law, the latter of which8 reigns in most other EU countries. The
German civil law is used as a convenient point of comparison to
the common law system of the UK. The comparative approach of
this essay concentrates on issues of interpretation. Part II addresses whether these issues of interpretation are obstacles to the
Common Frame of Reference which is a current project of contract
law harmonization in Europe.
I. WHAT, IF ANYTHING, HINDERS THE UK FROM ADOPTING THE
CISG?
Although the UK played a very active part in the drafting
and negotiating of the CISG,9 the country has not ratified the
CISG and, to date, no serious legislative steps have been taken
towards its ratification.10 After the Convention was promulgated,
the UK awaited the reaction of its trading partners. In a lecture
in Rome, Oxford Professor Barry Nicholas described this as a “policy of wait and see.”11 After some of the UK‟s major trading partners, notably the United States and Australia, and most EU
states adopted the Convention, the UK should have been more inclined to ratify as well.
A.G. GUEST ET AL., BENJAMIN‟S SALE OF GOODS 24-26 (7th ed. 2006).
It is common, and to some extent justified, to further differentiate between Roman legal systems and Germanic legal systems. See, e.g., Thomas
Kadner Graziano, La methode comparative internationale, in LE CONTRAT EN
DROIT PRIVÉ EUROPÉEN - EXERCISES DE COMPARAISON ET D‟HARMONISATION 317, 332
(2006).
9 Bruno Zeller, The Development of Uniform Laws – A Historical Perspective, 14 PACE INT‟L L. REV. 163, 168 (2002).
10 Sally Moss, Why the UK has not yet Ratified the CISG, 25 J.L. & COM.
483, 483 (2005).
11 Barry Nicholas, The United Kingdom and the Vienna Sales Convention:
Another Case of Splendid Isolation?, Lecture at Saggi, Conferenze e Seminari,
Centro di Studi e Ricerche di Diritto Comparato e Straniero [Centre for Comparative and Foreign Law Studies] (Mar. 1993) (Austria), available at
http://servizi.iit.cnr.it/~crdcs/crdcs/frames9.htm.
7
8
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The first steps were taken in 1989 and in 199712 when the
Department of Trade and Industry issued consultation documents
asking the business community for opinions on an eventual ratification of the CISG. While there was a majority in favor of ratification, the number of responses received were disappointing and
not representative, both in 1989 (55 responses, 28 in favor, 17
against, 10 neutral)13 and in 1997 (36 responses, 26 in favor, 7
against, 3 neutral).14 Nevertheless, one must dispense with the
idea that the UK will eventually adopt the Convention as soon as
there is time available in the legislative program.15 Apparently, it
is mainly the delay of the legislative process that prevents the UK
from becoming a contracting state of the CISG.16 In fact, most
English books on the sale of goods seem to take an eventual ratification for granted. There appears to be consent in the English
doctrine that the predecessors of the CISG, the Uniform Laws on
International Sales, which the UK has adopted, have been superseded by the Convention.17 Moreover, the growing importance of
trading partners in Asia is likely to be another factor for the UK
to take into account when it reconsiders its position regarding the
adoption of the CISG. In 1988, China ratified the CISG,18 and recently in 2008, Japan, another top five exporter and importer,19
12 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (VIENNA SALES CONVENTION):
A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT (1997) [hereinafter DTI CONSULTATION DOCUMENT],
available at http://bis.ecgroup.net/Search.aspx.
13 Id. ¶ 21.
14 Moss, supra note 10, at 483.
15 669 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2005) WA86; Alison E. Williams, Forecasting the Potential Impact of the Vienna Sales Convention on International Sales
Law in the UK, in 12 REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 9-57 (2000-01), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/williams.html#3.
16 Moss, supra note 10, at 483.
17 See CAROLE MURRAY, SCHMITTHOFF „S EXPORT TRADE: THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 853 (Leo D'Arcy & Barbara Cleave eds., 11th
ed. 2007); A. G. GUEST ET AL., supra note 7, at 24-26; but see JOSEPH CHITTY, 2
CHITTY ON CONTRACTS 1291 (Hugh Beale et al. eds., 29th ed. 2004) [hereinafter
CHITTY] (stating a little more reluctantly whether “the UK [should] adopt the
Convention”).
18 See Status 1980 - United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.h
tml.
19 In 2007, Japan was the world‟s fourth biggest exporter and importer.
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ratified the Convention.
Section A will explain why and how the UK initially ratified
the Uniform Laws on International Sales, but not the CISG. The
following section will consider some of the possible reasons for the
UK‟s long-time reluctance to adopt the CISG by analyzing Article
7 of the CISG, which is the Convention‟s provision on statutory
interpretation.
A. The Uniform Laws - Why the UK Adopted the “Wrong”
International Sales Law
The history of the unification of international sales law dates
back to the 1920s, when scholars of Western European countries,
first and foremost Ernst Rabel in his “Blue Report,”20 began formulating ideas about a uniform law of international sales and, in
1926, founded the International Institute for the Unification of
International Private Law (“UNIDROIT”).21 The CISG was therefore not the first attempt to unify international sales law. After
World War II interrupted the work of UNIDROIT, two conventions were adopted at a UNIDROIT conference in The Hague in
1964. These conventions were the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (“ULIS”) and the Convention relating to a
Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (“ULFIS”).
However, these conventions were not very successful.22 They
were only implemented by nine states: Belgium, the Gambia,
Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, San Marino, and the UK. Gambia and the UK are the only surviving contracting states.23 While the Uniform Laws have achieved consiWTO Report, International Trade Statistics 2008, 12, tbl. 1.8 (2008), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/its2008_e.pdf.
20 ERNST RABEL, RAPPORT SUR LE DROIT COMPARÉ DE VENTE PAR LE “INSTITUT
FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT” DE BERLIN (1938), reprinted in 3 ERNST RABEL, GESAMMELTE AUFSÄTZE (Hans G. Leser ed., 1967)
(F.R.G.).
21 See Schlechtriem, supra note 4, at 1; Henning Lutz, The CISG and Common Law Courts: Is There Really a Problem?, 35 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV.
711, 713 (2004).
22 See Ole Lando, CISG and Its Followers: A Proposal to Adopt Some International Principles of Contract Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 379, 379 (2005).
23 See Status of the UNIDROIT conventions, http://www.unidroit.org/ english/implement/i-64ulis.pdf, for the status of ULIS.
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derable importance in the practice of German, Benelux and Italian courts,24 they practically remained as a dead letter in the
UK.25 The reason for this lies in the reservation under which the
UK adopted the Uniform Laws26 as permitted by Article V of
ULIS stating that the UK “will apply the Uniform Law only to
contracts in which the parties thereto have . . . chosen that Law
as the law of the contract.”
The courts in the UK would therefore only apply ULIS as
well as ULFIS27 if the parties have chosen these laws to apply
and when the parties to the contract have their places of business
in different contracting states.28 To date, there are no reports of a
single case in the UK where the parties have chosen the Uniform
Laws to apply.29 In fact, it can hardly be concealed that the UK
could not decide whether to implement the Uniform Laws,30
which probably reflects its later reluctance to implement the
CISG. It is doubtful whether ratification under the reservation of
Article V of ULIS has any purpose whatsoever. Even without the
ratification, party autonomy would probably allow the choice of
the Uniform Laws anywhere in the world as long as mandatory
provisions remain unaffected.31
See Schlechtriem, supra note 4, at 1; see also INTERNATIONALE
RECHTSPRECHUNG ZU EKG UND EAG - EINE SAMMLUNG BELGISCHER, DEUTSCHER,
ITALIENISCHER, ISRAELISCHER UND NIEDERLÄNDISCHER ENTSCHEIDUNGEN ZU DEN
HAAGER EINHEITLICHEN KAUFGESETZEN (Peter Schlechtriem & Ulrich Magnus
eds., 1987) (F.R.G.) (provides collection of case law from Belgium, Germany, Italy, Israel and the Netherlands on ULIS and ULFIS in German).
25 Magnus, supra note 6, at 2.
26 See Uniform Laws on International Sales Act 1967 § 1(iii). The Uniform
Laws on International Sales Act of 1967 incorporates ULIS and ULFIS into English law. Id.
27 ULFIS has only ancillary character and applies only to contracts to which
ULIS is applied. Id.
28 Unlike the CISG, ULIS and ULFIS do not restrict their application to
contracts between parties of contracting states. Cf. Art. 1(1)(a). However, the
UK made another reservation to that effect as permitted by Art. III ULIS and
ULFIS. See Uniform Laws on International Sales Act 1967 § 1(i).
29 Magnus, supra note 6, at 2.
30 HANS-JOACHIM MERTENS & ECKARD REHBINDER, INTERNATIONALES
KAUFRECHT - KOMMENTAR ZU DEN EINHEITLICHEN KAUFGESETZEN [INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW - COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SALES LAWS], arts. 1-2 EKG [ULIS] ¶
16 (1995) (F.R.G.).
31 Hans-Georg Landfermann, Neues Recht für den Internationalen Kauf
[New Law for International Sales], in
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENZEITSCHRIFT [NJW] 385, 387 (1974) (F.R.G.).
24
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The implementation of the Uniform Laws in the UK cannot
be seen as a sign of the UK‟s general willingness to move towards
a unification of sales law, 32 since it was implemented in a very restrictive way. Unlike the Uniform Laws, the CISG cannot be
adopted with a reservation limiting its application to cases of parties‟ choice,33 and its adoption would therefore have a much greater influence on UK law than the reserved adoption of the Uniform
Laws. If the parties did not want the UK courts to apply the
CISG they would have to opt out of it.34 In fact, the ULIS and
ULFIS could safely be implemented without making a significant
difference, while the adoption of the CISG on the other hand
would bring a real change in the law applicable to international
contracts. As a result, the UK was less reluctant to adopt the
Uniform Laws than it is to adopt the CISG. This was probably
the wrong decision since international support for the Uniform
Laws, which were perceived as Western European creations that
were not adapted to the needs of modern trade,35 was disappointing, especially because the CISG has clearly superseded the Uniform Laws.
B. Why Not Adopt the CISG? - A Comparison of English and
German Laws
As stated, the resistance against adopting the CISG in the
UK appears to have decreased. Upon a question by Lord Lester of
Herne Hill in the House of Lords on February 7, 2005 regarding
why the CISG has not yet been ratified, Lord Sainsbury of Turville from the Department of Trade and Industry36 answered that,
“[t]he UK intends to ratify the convention, subject to the availability of parliamentary time. There have been delays in the past
for a number of reasons, but we propose to issue a consultation

See Ahmad Azzouni, The Adoption of the 1980 Convention on the International Sale of Goods by the UK (2002), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu
/cisg/biblio/azzouni.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). In his introduction, Azzouni
calls the UK‟s ratification “more a form of gesture than a real commitment.” Id.
33 A.G. GUEST ET AL., supra note 7, at 24; CHITTY, supra note 17, at 1291.
34 CHITTY, supra note 17, at 1291.
35 Lando, supra note 22, at 379.
36 Now called the United Kingdom Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills (BIS), previously referred to as Department for Business, Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform (BERR).
32
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document in the course of the next few months to examine the
available options.”37
However, more than three years later, in fall of 2008, no consultation document had yet been issued and the statement that
there have been “delays” in the adoption of the Convention may
be slightly understated. In fact, there has been considerable opposition to the ratification of the Convention in the UK,38 and the
supporters of the CISG are still awaiting the examination of the
“available options” formulated by Lord Sainsbury of Turville,39
and eventually any governmental and parliamentary steps towards ratification. 40
There are several reasons why the UK is so reluctant to adopt
the Convention. A commonly raised concern41 is that the CISG is
less suitable to commodity sales42 than the English Sale of Goods
Act due, in part, to the CISG‟s stricter provisions on contract
avoidance in case of non-conforming goods and documents.43 For
example, Articles 25 and 49 of the CISG indicate that a fundamental breach is a precondition for avoidance of contract, whereas
according to the English Sale of Goods Act, any non-conformity
would be considered as a breach of condition (the so-called perfect
tender rule) and thus a ground for termination of the contract.
Furthermore, critics allege an incompatibility of the CISG‟s provi669 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2005) WA86.
See The Hon. Justice James Douglas, Arbitration of the International Sale
of Goods Disputes Under the Vienna Convention, Paper delivered at the Institute
of Arbitrators and Mediators Australia National Conference 2006, available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/douglas.html.
39 669 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2005) WA86.
40 The CISG can only be implemented through primary legislation in the
UK. This basically means that a member of parliament (Private Member‟s bill)
or the Government department concerned would have to make a proposal upon
which a bill would have to be drafted which would then have to pass several
stages (readings, amendments, votes) in both the House of Commons and House
of Lords. For details, see House of Commons Information Office, Parliamentary
Stages
of
a
Government
Bill,
Factsheet
L1
(2007),
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/l01.pdf.
41 Michael Bridge, A Law for International Sales, 37 H.K. L.J. 17, 40 (2007).
42 A commodity sale is a sale of basic resources or agricultural products (e.g.,
crude oil, salt, rice, aluminum etc.), often traded while in transit. See also Bruno
Zeller, Commodity Sales and the CISG, in SHARING INTERNATIONAL LAW ACROSS
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: FESTSCHRIFT FOR ALBERT H. KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF
HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 627, 628 (Camilla B. Andersen & Ulrich G. Schroeder
eds., 2008).
43 Bridge, supra note 41, at 22-23.
37
38
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sions on passing of risk (CISG Articles 66-70) with the International Commercial Terms (“INCOTERMS”) FOB (Free on Board)
and CIF (Coast, Insurance and Freight).44 However, under CISG
Article 6, party autonomy is an underlying principle of the CISG.
If the contract stipulates that non-conforming goods or documents
shall be a ground for avoidance or if it contains an INCOTERM
such as FOB or CIF, like most commodity sales contracts,45 courts
give effect to such terms.46 The CISG, if used in conjunction with
INCOTERMS and the stipulations of the parties, only plays a
supplementary role, “which may even prove palatable to the
United Kingdom – one day!”47
Another possible criticism is the vagueness of some of the
Convention‟s provisions, such as Article 7 on statutory interpretation and good faith. Given the initial lack of English case law regarding these provisions in contrast to the large number of cases
decided under the Sale of Goods Act, English lawyers are cautious
about favoring the Convention without knowing how English
courts would apply and interpret it.48
In the following analysis, the focus will lie on the reconcilability of English views on (a) statutory interpretation and (b) on the
principle of good faith with respect to Article 7 of the CISG. Similarly, it is instructive to examine a civil law perspective as a point
of comparison when determining UK‟s apprehension in ratifying
the CISG. More specifically, the German perspective with regard
to statutory interpretation and good faith is dispositive since contrary to the UK, Germany more readily welcomed the ratification
of the CISG.49 This analysis may be useful to give an outlook on
Id. at 37-38.
See Guide to CISG Article 67, Text of Secretariat Commentary on Article
79 of the 1978 Draft [draft counterpart of CISG art. 67], http://www.
cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-67.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
46 Lachmi Singh & Benjamin Leisinger, A Law for International Sale of
Goods: A Reply to Michael Bridge, 20 PACE INT‟L L. REV. 161, 188 (2008).
47 Ingeborg Schwenzer, The Danger of Domestic Pre-Conceived Views with
Respect to the Uniform Interpretation of the CISG: The Question of Avoidance in
the Case of Non-Conforming Goods and Document, 36 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L.
REV. 795, 807 (2005).
48 However, there is a growing caseload on the CISG by courts of other countries, including common law countries such as Australia, New Zealand or the
United
States,
to
refer
to.
Cf.
Pace
CISG
Database,
Country Case Schedule, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html.
49 As shown by the relatively early entry into force (Jan. 1, 1991), the large
44
45
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possible consequences for both English law and jurisprudence and
for the interpretation of the CISG, should the UK eventually ratify the CISG. At the very least, examining the German approach
as a point of reference might shed light on some obstacles that
other projects directed at the harmonization of European contract
law currently face.50
1. Article 7 and Statutory Interpretation: Literal vs. Purposive
Approach
Article 7(1) of the CISG states that “[in] the interpretation of
this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character
and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the
observance of good faith in international trade.” In order to promote uniformity in the CISG‟s application, it is necessary that
courts in different legal systems apply similar rules when interpreting the Convention‟s provisions in order to avoid divergent results. However, the traditional approach of statutory interpretation applied by English courts is different from the approach used
in civil law jurisdictions. In fact, to a German lawyer, the English
rules of interpretation might even appear strange and irritating.51
a. Traditional English Approach to Statutory Interpretation
Originating at different stages in legal history, three rules of
statutory interpretation have been identified in the UK, namely
the literal, golden and mischief rules. According to the literal
rule, words must be given their ordinary and natural meaning.
The golden rule allows a departure from the ordinary meaning only if there is ambiguity or an absurd result, while the mischief
rule looks at the mischief the statute was supposed to cure in or-

amount of scholarly writing on the CISG in German and the large number of reported cases from Germany. See Pace CISG Database, Bibliography of CISG Materials in German, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/biblio-ger.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2009); Pace CISG Database, Country Case Schedule, Germany,
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html#germany (last visited Dec. 27,
2009).
50 See infra Part II.
51 Kurt Haertel & Dieter Stauder, Zur Auslegung Von Internationalem Einheitsrecht [On the Interpretation of International Uniform Law], 2 GRUR INT‟L
85, 86 (1982) (F.R.G.).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/4

10

2010]

OBSTACLES TO UK RATIFICATION OF THE CISG 155

der to interpret the statute. 52
While those rules seem to allow for some flexibility, especially
since in practice judges may choose their preferred rule or apply
all three,53 the rules were often applied in a rather restrictive
manner. As matter of principle, Parliament‟s intention had to
appear directly from the text of the statute and neither the legislative history (travaux préparatoires)54 nor a doctrine55 was regularly considered as an appropriate aid for statutory interpretation.56
b. German Approach to Statutory Interpretation
Under German law it is generally accepted that the court,
when interpreting statutes, takes into account the literal meaning
of the words, the grammatical structure of the sentence, the legislative history, and the systematic context of a legal rule.57 German courts regularly cite parliamentary materials58 as well as
different opinions in legal textbooks. When it comes to interpreting provisions of the CISG, German courts also look at the legislative history of provisions59 as well as at international scholarly
writing.60
The most flexible approach to interpret statutes accepted under German law is the so-called teleological approach (teleologische Auslegung), which allows the judge to look for what he considers to be the purpose (telos) of a statute in order to reduce or
S.H. BAILEY ET AL., THE MODERN ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2007).
Id.
54 Cf., e.g., Davis v. Johnson, [1978] 1 All E.R. 1132 (Eng.) (where the use of
parliamentary minutes was not permitted by the House of Lords).
55 It used to be convention that works of living authors could not be cited in
court, since they might change their minds. However, this convention is no longer observed (see SMITH, BAILEY & GUNN, supra note 52, ¶ 7-033).
56 Haertel & Stauder, supra note 51, at 86-87.
57 Reinhard Zimmermann, Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture,
in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 1, 24 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds.,
2005).
58 In Germany parliamentary materials are published as “Bundestagsdrucksachen” (BT-Drs.).
59 E.g., Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main [OLG] [Provincial Court of
Appeal], Apr. 20, 1994, 13 U 51/93, http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do
=case&id=47&step=FullText (making reference to a rejected Canadian proposal
to include a criterion of “satisfactory quality” into Article 35 of CISG).
60 Close to all German decisions refer to legal doctrine.
52
53
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extend its application, departing thereby from its wording. This
is a rather wide approach and might even be criticized for going
far beyond what can be called interpretation, constituting in fact
a form of judicial law making.61
c. Modern English Approach to Interpreting International
Conventions
If the UK were to ratify the CISG, there is danger that English judges will interpret its provisions too literally without taking
into account the history of the Convention at the Vienna Conference and the aim to achieve uniformity. There is a concern that
English courts tend to regard legislation adopting international
conventions “as a step in the development of English law, . . . inclined to apply to such legislation canons of construction developed by English municipal law [and] to construe such legislation
in the light of previous English authorities.”62
However, given the recent developments in English jurisprudence, this concern must be considered minimal. Today, even
with regard to the interpretation of English statutes, the attitude
of English courts is considerably more relaxed. External aids of
interpretation such as modern textbooks,63 and since the House of
Lords decision Pepper v. Hart,64 parliamentary materials are admitted. In fact, English courts now seem to prefer the so-called
purposive approach to statutory construction. This approach calls
for the statute to be interpreted in light of its purpose, which, of
course, needs to first be discovered with the help of interpretative
aids. Lord Scarman, in a lecture held in Australia, described this
evolution rather ironically. He emphasized that “[i]n London noone would now dare to choose the literal rather than a purposive
construction.”65
61 CLAUS-WILHELM
CANARIS & KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 187 (3d ed. 1995) (F.R.G.).
62 Francis A. Mann, The Interpretation of Uniform Statute, 62 L.Q. REV. 278,
284 (1946).
63 RICHARD WARD ET. AL., WALKER & WALKER‟S ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 11
(9th ed. 2005); see also Bettinson v. Langton, [1999] 2 All E.R. 367, 375 (Eng.)
(Robert Walker LJ referring to various textbooks as “valuable assistance”).
64 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart, [1992] 3 W.L.R 1032 (Eng.) (setting
several conditions in which parliamentary materials may be referred to).
65 Lord Scarman, The Common Law Judge and the Twentieth Century Happy Marriage or Irretrievable Breakdown?, 7 MONASH U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1980).
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When it comes to the interpretation of international conventions, two English House of Lords decisions, James Buchanan &
Co. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping66 and Fothergill v. Monarch
Airlines,67 show that English courts thoughtfully chose their interpretation methods and interpret provisions in light of the aim
of the Convention. In James Buchanan, Lord Wilberforce clarified that interpreting statutes is different from interpreting international conventions when stating that, “[t]he assumed and often repeated generalization that English methods are narrow,
technical and literal, whereas continental methods are broad, generous and sensible, seems to me insecure at least as regards interpretation of international conventions.”68
After considering both the English and the French texts69 of
the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of
Goods by Road as well as interpretative decisions from different
jurisdictions, the Lords found the French text no more precise
than the English text, and the foreign court decisions too diverging to be of much help.70 Nevertheless, it was held by the majority71 that any interpretation should be “unconstrained by technical
rules of English law, or by English legal precedent, but on broad
principles of general acceptation.”72 This demonstrates that English courts are able to interpret a convention‟s provision with regards to its international character. This notion is in accord with
Article7 of the CISG and would be instructive if the CISG were
ever adopted in the UK.

66 James Buchanan & Co. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping, Ltd., [1978] 1
Lloyd‟s Rep. 119 (Eng.).
67 Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines, Ltd., [1980] 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. 295, [1980] All
E.R. 696 (Eng.), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/england.fothergill.v. monarch.airlines.hl.1980.
68 James Buchanan & Co., 1 Lloyd‟s Rep. at 123.
69 Although, Viscount Dilhorne expressed some doubts about this approach.
See id. at 126.
70 Id. at 123, 128 for Lord Wilberforce‟s and Lord Salmon‟s opinions.
71 The two dissenting members of the Court, Lord Edmund-Davies and Lord
Fraser of Tullybelton, did not agree with this approach and applied the English
rule “ejusdem generis.” Ejusdem generis means that general words which follow
specific ones are taken to include only things of the same kind. See CATHERINE
ELLIOTT & FRANCES QUINN, ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 50 (8th ed. 2007).
72 James Buchanan & Co., 1 Lloyd‟s Rep. at 122 (discussing Lord Wilberforce‟s opinion).
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In Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines,73 the House of Lords not
only applied a purposive approach to construction but even went
so far as to reference the legislative history of an international
convention, the Warsaw Convention on International Carriage by
Air. As Lord Wilberforce opined:
“[I]n the Federal Republics of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg,
The Netherlands and Belgium both “administrative “ and other
courts have recourse in varying degrees, but generally with prudence and caution, to preparatory work of the laws of the legislature
[and] there may be cases where such travaux préparatoires can
profitably be used.”74

Furthermore, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties75 (“VC”), which entered into force in the UK in 1980, provides for methods concerning the interpretation of international
conventions in Articles 31. Similar to Article 7 of the CISG, the
relevant provisions of the VC stipulate as follows:
VC Article 31(1): “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”
VC Article 32(2): “Recourse may be had to supplementary
means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion . . . .”
Lord Diplock, another judge in the case of Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines, acknowledged that these rules of the VC “codify
already existing public international law.”76 Since English courts
are prepared to follow the rules of the VC, there seems to be no
reason to assume that they would not be willing to interpret the
CISG in light of its international character and with the aim to
achieve uniformity as provided by Article 7.
Finally, it is fair to say that English courts have their own
method of interpreting statutes - a method which has its benefits
Fothergill, 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. at 295.
Id. at 301-02.
75 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, UN Doc.
A/Conf.39/27, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
76 Fothergill, 2 Lloyd‟s Rep. at 304.
73
74
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- but they are also prepared to look at the practice of courts in
other jurisdictions in order to not reach a result inconsistent with
international jurisprudence. If the UK ratifies the CISG, jurisprudence by English courts might be very valuable, especially
since other common law states such as Australia, New Zealand or
the United States might be more willing to apply the CISG under
emerging precedents from the UK as the “cradle of common
law.”77
2. Article 7 and Good Faith: A Rule of Interpretation or More?
When the Roman philosopher, politician and lawyer Marcus
Tullius Cicero, explained to his son Marcus that the “foundation
of justice [was] good faith,” he referred to “truth and fidelity to
promises and agreements.”78 Truth, fidelity, fairness, and reasonableness are concepts most people would associate with good
faith as a moral obligation. Nevertheless, good faith is admittedly
very vague as a legal concept. While this essay does not attempt
to define good faith, one has to consider that the definition of good
faith in contract law might turn out quite differently depending
on whether it is written from a civil or common law perspective.
a. The Principle of Good Faith in German Law
Section 242 of the German Civil Code79 states that: “The debtor is bound to effect performance according to the requirements
of good faith, giving consideration to common usage.”80 This general principle originated in Roman law (bona fides) where it was
the basis for claims based on otherwise non-defined contracts.81

77 Monica Kilian, CISG and the Problem with Common Law Jurisdictions,
10 J. TRANSNAT‟L L. & POL‟Y 217, 233 (2001), available at
http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol102/kilian.pdf.
78 MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 23 (Loeb Classical Library ed., Walter Miller trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1913), translation available at
http://www.constitution.org/rom/de_officiis.htm.
79 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18. 1896, § 242.
80 “Der Schuldner ist verpflichtet, die Leistung so zu bewirken, wie Treu und
Glauben mit Rücksicht auf die Verkehrssitte es erfordern” translated in JOHN O.
HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION § 94 (3d ed. 1999).
81 DIETER MEDICUS, SCHULDRECHT I - ALLGEMEINER TEIL ¶ 124 (16th ed.
2005) (F.R.G.).
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In today‟s German law, the good faith principle is the basis, or rather the crown, of all obligations arising out of contract or tort.82
Nowadays, the principle not only applies to contract law and tort
law but also to the law of property, public law, and procedural
law.83 It contains the idea that reasonable reliance84 and the interests of the parties85 should be protected in every legal relation.
German courts applied the good faith principle, inter alia, as
a bar against claims86 or as a basis for ancillary contractual obligations.87 The parties are, for example, obliged to refrain from
every act, which could harm the purpose of the contract.88 Furthermore, the concept of a pre-contractual relationship, culpa in
contrahendo, giving rise to liability has first been developed by
the jurisprudence based on the principle of good faith. Now culpa
in contrahendo has a statutory basis in section 311 II of BGB
(German Civil Code). Nevertheless, the principle of good faith is
still employed to determine the obligations arising from such a
pre-contractual relationship.89 Until the reform of the German
Law of Obligations in 2002, section 242 of BGB was also the basis
for the modification of contract in cases comparable to hardship or
frustration of purpose (now BGB Section 313)90 and for the cancelId. ¶ 125.
HANS BROX & WOLF-DIETRICH WALKER, ALLGEMEINES SCHULDRECHT § 7, ¶
1 (32d ed. 2007) (F.R.G.).
84 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Supreme Court], May 22, 1985 (F.R.G.), 94
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ], 344 (351)
(F.R.G.); OTTO PALANDT ET AL., BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (BGB), KOMMENTAR §
242, ¶ 3 (67th ed. 2008).
85 PALANDT, supra note 84, § 242, ¶ 5.
86 So called “unzulässige Rechtsausübung” (improper exercise of a right).
See, e.g., Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Supreme Court] 10, 75 (F.R.G.); BGHZ 79, 204; BGHZ 94, 246. This bar applies for
example if someone claims a sum he is bound to repay shortly afterwards or in
cases of venire contra factum proprium (contradictory behavior).
87 See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Supreme Court], Mar 10, 1983, III ZR
169/81, published in NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENZEITSCHRIFT [NJW] 2814 (1983);
PALANDT, supra note 84, § 242, ¶¶ 23-25.
88 See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Supreme Court], VIII ZR 99/94, Mar
13, 1996, VIII ZR 99/94 (F.R.G.), published in Neue JURISTISCHE
WOCHENZEITSCHRIFT-RECHTSPRECHUNGSREPORT [NJW-RR] 949 (1996); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Supreme Court], Oct. 15, 2004, V ZR. 100/04 (F.R.G.), published in ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 2345 (2004).
89 BROX & WALKER, supra note 83, § 7, ¶ 12.
90 So called “Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage,” based on the Roman concept
clausula rebus sic stantibus.
82
83
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lation of long term contracts for just cause (now BGB Section
314).91 In turn, the principle of good faith has to be respected in
the interpretation of contracts. Section 157 of BGB states this
expressly: “Contracts shall be interpreted according to the requirements of good faith, taking into account common usage.”
In addition, section 242 of BGB is often criticized for being
too imprecise and giving rise to judicial law making based on equity.92 The German Federal Supreme Court held in an important
decision that the courts should not substitute the consequences
imposed by the contract or by law with consequences which they
consider more equitable under the circumstances.93 Section 242
of BGB should only be applied to set groups of cases which have
been defined by 100 years of jurisprudence.94
As seen in Germany, the concept of good faith applies not only to the interpretation of statutory provisions, but it has further
functions. For example, good faith concretizes the manner in
which obligations are to be fulfilled, supplements contracts by being a basis for ancillary obligations, serves as a bar to claims and
may correct unjust results of the law or clauses of a contract. 95
Although the notion has been clarified by the German jurisprudence, the broadness of the term “Treu und Glauben” (good
faith) still gives rise to uncertainty. Probably every first year law
student in Germany is warned to apply section 242 of BGB only
very cautiously, its unjustified application being a common mistake in civil law examinations. This does not only seem to be a
phenomenon among law students but even courts and scholars
because they tend to abandon concrete legal provisions by applying the general section 242. As Professor Schlechtriem remarked
in a 1997 publication of the Centro di studi e ricerche di diritto
comparato e straniero in Rome: “[O]ne can find a court decision or
a scholarly theory applying the [good faith] provision to almost
every situation governed by the Civil Code, and in addition very

PALANDT, supra note 84, § 242, ¶ 2.
BROX & WALKER, supra note 83, § 7, ¶¶ 2-3.
93 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Supreme Court], VIII ZR 119/84, May 06,
1985 VIII ZR 119/84 (F.R.G.), published in NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENZEITSCHRIFT [NJW] 2579, 2580 (1985) (F.R.G.).
94 PALANDT, supra note 84, § 242, ¶ 3.
95 Cf. PALANDT, supra note 84, § 242, ¶¶ 13-14a (explaining these four functions of good faith).
91
92
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often overriding the text and the meaning of special provisions.”96
In sum, the German good faith principle, as codified in section 242, gives courts the flexibility that is necessary when dealing with imprecise, incomplete or unjust contracts or legal provisions. However, the preference is to follow more detailed and
precise provisions of the BGB rather than the vague concept of
“Treu und Glauben.” One has to admit that any excessive use of a
general good faith principle leads to uncertainty and unpredictability of the law. Fortunately, the risk of uncertainty is limited in
Germany, since many valuable results of the application of the
good faith principle have been codified. With regard to those possible applications, which lack specific statutory basis, there is
enough case law specifying detailed criteria for the application of
the good faith provision found in section 242 of BGB.
b. Is There a Principle of Good Faith Under English Law?
Some common law jurisdictions have taken up or at least
considered the concept of good faith.97 The American Uniform
Commercial Code (“UCC”), for example, defines good faith in Article 2 Section 2-103 (1)(b): “„Good faith‟ in the case of a merchant
means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.” However, the UCC‟s
good faith concept does not go as far as the German good faith
concept which also applies to pre-contractual obligations. Good
faith is made specifically applicable to the UCC only to the extent
set forth in UCC Article 1 Section 1-203; namely, “[e]very contract
or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement.”
In Bobux Marketing v. Raynor Marketing, decided on October
3, 2001, the Court of Appeal of Wellington in New Zealand examined the development of the concept of good faith in common
law with obiter reference to the CISG and the UNIDROIT principles. The presiding Judge Thomas found that good faith is per-

96 Peter Schlechtriem, Good Faith in German Law and in International Uniform Laws, Lecture at Saggi, Conferenze e Seminari, Centro di Studi e Ricerche
di Diritto Comparato e Straniero [Centre for Comparative and Foreign Law Studies] (Mar. 3, 1997), translation available at http://servizi.iit.cnr.it/~crdcs/
crdcs/frames24.htm.
97 CHITTY, supra note 17, at 1291.
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ceived “as loyalty to a promise”98 and that there should be an obligation to perform in good faith, at least in long-term contracts.99
On the other hand, under English law, good faith is not a general
requirement concerning the exercise of legal rights.100 Some scholars even consider the notion of good faith as basically unknown
to English law; a British attorney would “rarely comprehend”101
the concept of good faith or “not know quite what it means.”102
While this could also be said of most German lawyers, English
courts are certainly, or perhaps justifiably, more reluctant to assume duties arising out of such a broad concept.
In the leading English House of Lord‟s case Walford v. Miles,
a pre-contractual duty to negotiate in good faith was denied on
the ground that this would be inconceivable with the nature of
negotiations in which each party pursues its own interests. 103
Traditionally, an English judge is more concerned with “preserving the parties‟ freedom to contract” and ensuring that contracts
are “performed accurately according to their precise wording” and
less concerned “with providing means for ensuring the fairness in
the relationship between the parties.”104
There is no general principle of good faith established in English law. However, this has not always been the case. In 1766,
Lord Mansfield considered good faith as the “governing principle
[which] is applicable to all contracts and dealings.”105 Further98 Bobux Marketing, Ltd. v. Raynor Marketing, Ltd., [2002] 1 N.Z.L.R. 506,
2001
NZLR
LEXIS
66
(H.C.),
available
at
http://www.ipsofactoj.com/international/2002/Part02/int2002(2)-008.htm.
99 However, the other two judges did not comment on the issue of good faith
and dismissed the appeal on different grounds. Id. ¶ 81.
100 Azzouni, supra note 32, pt. I, subdiv. B.
101 Christopher Sheaffer, The Failure of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and a Proposal for a New Uniform
Global Code in International Sales Law, 15 CARDOZO J. INT‟L & COMP. L. 461, 465
(2007).
102 Roy Goode, The Concept of “Good Faith" in English Law, Lecture at Saggi, Conferenze e Seminari, Centro di Studi e Ricerche di Diritto Comparato e
Straniero [Centre for Comparative and Foreign Law Studies] (1992), translation
available at http://servizi.iit.cnr.it/~crdcs/crdcs/frames2.htm.
103 Walford v. Miles [1992] 2 A.C. 128.
104 Giuditta Cordero Moss, Contracts between Consumer Protection and
Trade Usages: Some Observations on the Importance of State Contract Law, in
COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE AND EXISTING EC CONTRACT LAW 64, 68 (Reiner
Schulze ed., 2008).
105 Carter v. Boehm, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B.).
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more, even though English law may not acknowledge a general
principle of good faith, comparable considerations such as fairness
and reasonableness are considered in various situations.106 When
interpreting contracts, English judges seek to reach a reasonable
result,107 since the courts sometimes include implied terms into
contracts for reasons of fairness.108 Certain contract types, such
as agency contracts and mortgages, impose a duty on the parties
to act other than in their own interest.109 Finally, equitable concepts, such as promissory estoppel,110 or equitable remedies,111
which the Courts grant at their discretion, are solely based on
fairness.112
In fact, the civil law idea of good faith is, in its broadest
sense, probably related to the English concept of equity.113 In
England, equity developed around the 15th century to balance out
the harsh rules of the common law.114 Equitable remedies are different from common law remedies, and equity used to be administered by different courts.115 Since 1873, equity has been administered by the same courts as the common law;116 where there is
conflict between common law and equity, equity prevails.117 Of
course, equity is entirely a system of justice while good faith finds
its main application only in contract law. Nevertheless, both are
based on the idea of natural justice and fairness which cannot always be achieved by strict rules of law.
To conclude, English law does not have a general principle of

CHITTY, supra note 17, at 1291.
Id.
108 Id.; Johan Steyn, The Role of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Contract
Law: A Hair-Shirt Philosophy?, DENNING L.J. 131, 133 (1991).
109 CHITTY, supra note 17, at 1291.
110 Cf. Cent. London Prop. Trust, Ltd. v. High Trees House, Ltd., [1947] K.B.
130 (the leading case on promissory estoppel).
111 For example, specific performance is an equitable remedy under English
law.
112 CHITTY, supra note 17, at 1291.
113 See generally 5 J.F. O‟CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN ENGLISH LAW (1990).
114 ELLIOTT & QUINN, supra note 71, at 108-09.
115 First, equity was administered by the Chancellor, a member of the clergy
and chief minister of the King.
116 The Judicature Acts 1873-75 established the English court structure of
today.
117 This was first held in the Earl of Oxford’s Case decided in 1615. ELLIOT &
QUINN, supra note 71, at 109.
106
107

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/4

20

2010]

OBSTACLES TO UK RATIFICATION OF THE CISG 165

good faith. Certainly, pre-contractual duties cannot arise from
this principle under English law. In contrast, under German law,
a culpa in contrahendo liability has been developed from the good
faith concept. However, English lawyers are familiar with concepts such as fairness, reasonableness and equity. In many cases,
English lawyers achieve the same results by way of detailed rules
and duties established by precedents in the same way civil lawyers would achieve a similar result by assuming a duty of good
faith.118
Nevertheless, one has to admit that English lawyers will
have a problem with accepting a duty of good faith as far reaching
as provided by German law. This result is predictable given the
defensible criticism of the broadness and uncertainty of the German notion of good faith.119
c. Good Faith Under the CISG
Article 7 of the CISG provides that in interpreting the Convention there shall be regard for promoting “the observance of
good faith in international trade.” This language was adopted as
a compromise between two divergent views.120 The first, mostly
expressed by civil law delegates, was that there should be a general rule that the parties must act in good faith; the other view
was that such a rule would lead to uncertainty. The comparison
between German and English laws illustrates the broad sweep of
such divergent views. Under German law, the good faith principle was and may still be “Mädchen für Alles,”121 meaning a solution of last resort to any legal problem. In contrast, English law
does not acknowledge a general good faith principle, but only specific applications of it.
Of course, during the deliberations to Article7 of the CISG at
the Vienna Conference, the UK representative was opposed to the
introduction of a separate provision calling for the respect of good
See Goode, supra note 102.
See Schlechtriem, supra note 96.
120 See HONNOLD, supra note 80, § 94.
121 “Mädchen für Alles” is a colloquial German expression meaning utility
man / girl Friday. See Gyula Eörsi, General Provisions, in INTERNATIONAL SALES:
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF
GOODS
2-6
(Matthew
Bender
ed.,
1984),
available
at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/eorsi1.html#203.
118
119
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faith and fair dealing.122 This view was respected by the majority
of the other delegates and an express reference to the good faith
principle is to be found solely in Article7 relating to the Convention‟s interpretation. However, there are numerous applications
of the good faith principle throughout the Convention. For example, Article 16(2)(b) addresses the irrevocability of an offer in cases where there is reasonable act of reliance on such irrevocability;
Article 21(2) addresses the status of an acceptance which was received late although it was dispatched timely or Article 40, which
bars the seller from relying on a failure of timely notice of nonconformity by the buyer if the seller knew or could not have been
unaware of the non-conformity.123 All these articles are premised
on the good faith principle. Moreover, the reasonable person
standard found in Article 8(2) of the CISG, concerning the interpretation of statements and conduct of the parties, can also serve
a similar purpose to that of an obligation of good faith and fair
dealing.
While the good faith principle in Article 7 of the CISG is very
restrictive, its meaning is still unclear124 when compared to the
German Law of Obligations‟ section 242 of BGB.125 The problem
that arises is how to find the relevant standards of good faith,
given that those standards differ considerably in the world and
that the principle of autonomous interpretation does not allow for
transfer of domestic good faith concepts into the Convention. At
the same time, good faith should not be used as a “super-tool” to
override more specific rules of the CISG.126
122 Legislative History, 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference, Summary
Records of Meetings of the First Committee, 5th meeting (Mar. 13, 1980),
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/firstcommittee/Meeting5.html.
123 Cf. Secretariat Commentary on Article 6 of the 1978 Draft [draft counterpart of CISG art. 7(1)], http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/se comm7.html, for further examples.
124 Cf. Benedict C. Sheehy, Good Faith in the CISG: The Interpretation Problems of Article 7 (Berkeley College, Working Paper No. 339, 2004), in THE
BERKELEY
ELECTRONIC
PRESS
(BEPRESS)
LEGAL
SERIES,
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1815&context=expresso (providing an extensive paper on the CISG‟s good faith principle).
125 PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW - THE UN-CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 39 (1986), available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem.html.
126 Peter
Huber, Some Introductory Remarks on the CISG, in 6
INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT 228, 228-29 (2006), available at http://www.
cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/huber.html.
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In practice, there appears to be a consensus that good faith in
Article 7 is a principle of interpretation and not a duty. However,
prior case law has applied Article 7‟s principle of good faith rather
broadly. In the French case, BRI Production “Bonaventure” v.
Pan African Export,127 the court referred to Article 7 of the CISG
and awarded 10,000 francs in damages for abuse of process constituting a breach of the good faith principle. In Hungary, an arbitral tribunal explicitly stated that it considered good faith not
merely as an interpretive tool but as a standard of behavior which
must be respected.128 Decisions like these use Article 7 to impose
substantive obligations of good faith and fair dealing on the parties, an approach highly criticized because it perverts the fact
that Article 7 of the CISG is clearly a compromise between the far
reaching notion of good faith in civil law and the skepticism towards this notion in common law,129 as revealed by its negotiating
history.130
While from a civil law point of view it might be beneficial and
desirable to introduce a duty of good faith in international
trade,131 the legislative history of the CISG Article 7 shows that
good faith under the CISG is not supposed to go so far as to impose duties. Still, one should not call the CISG‟s notion of good
faith “dead” or consigned to a “ghetto.”132 The principle of good
faith, as embodied not only in Article 7 but also in the more spe127 Cour d‟Appel [CA][regional court of appeal] Grenoble, No. 93/3275, Feb.
22, 1995, in JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL [J.D.I.] 632 (1995), translated in
PACE REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS
(CISG)
379
(1998),
available
at
http://www.
cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/950222f1.html.
128 Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry Court of Arbitration, Arbitral Award, No. VB/94124, Nov. 17, 1995, pt. IV, ¶ 6, available at
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=217&step=FullText
(in
German).
129 E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing under the
UNIDROIT Principles, Relevant International Conventions, and National Laws,
3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 56 (1994); see also Disa Sim, The Scope and Application of Good Faith in the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale
of
Goods,
PACE L. SCH. INST. INT„L COM. L. (2001),
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sim1.html (last updated Sept. 25, 2001).
130 Cf. Legislative History, supra note 122, ¶¶ 45, 54, 62 (regarding two proposals of Norway and Italy to change the text of the provision which found little
support because the text as-is already presented a “delicately-balanced compromise”).
131 See Eörsi, supra note 121, § 2.03.
132 Id.
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cific provisions such as Articles 16 (2)(b), 21(2) and 40 of the
CISG, is acknowledged as one of the general principles on which
the Convention is based.133 It can therefore be referred to as a
gap-filling principle for matters governed by, but not expressly
settled in the CISG.
If correctly applied in line with its drafting history, the
CISG‟s good faith principle is very restrictive. It does not extend
nearly as far as the German notion of good faith found in section
242 of BGB. If England were to adopt the CISG, good faith notion
found in Article 7 should not materially alter or introduce major
changes into English law. However, given the different understandings of the concept drawing from the prior decided cases,
there is some truth in the criticism often brought forward that
good faith in Article7 of the CISG would give rise to uncertainty
and diverging decisions.134
C. Conclusion to Part I: Can the CISG Harmonize European
Contract Law?
Overall, the CISG can be considered a success because on a
global scale the CISG has been ratified by both common law and
civil law countries. However, case law from common law jurisdictions is still scarce.135 With the exception of Part II on the formation of contracts136 (as authorized by the Convention, compared to
the provisions of Part IV), the reservations made by several states
when adopting the Convention considerably limit the CISG‟s effect on the unification of Sales law.137
Joseph Lookofsky, The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS CONTRACTS 1, 50 (J. Herbots & R. Blanpain eds., 2000), available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky.html.
134 Cf. P.J. Powers, Defining the Undefinable: Good Faith and the United Nations Sale of Goods, 18 J.L. & COM. 333, 347-48 (1999), available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/powers.html (stating, “the uniformity
sought by the CISG is definitely lacking with respect to . . . good faith”); see also
Nicholas, supra note 11; DTI CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 12 (reflecting
similar criticism); cf. also Derek Wheatley, Why I Oppose the Wind of Change,
TIMES (U.K.), Mar. 27, 1990, at 31 (addressing a general concern about the danger of diverging decisions if the CISG was to be ratified in the UK).
135 Kilian, supra note 77, at 218.
136 This reservation, in accordance with Article 92 (1) of the CISG, was made
by the Scandinavian countries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.
137 For alternative analysis, compare DTI CONSULTATION DOCUMENT , supra
133
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Moreover, not only did some states limit the applicability of
the CISG by way of reservations, many parties to contracts of sale
also chose to explicitly exclude the application of the CISG by virtue of Article 6. True to the motto “what the peasant does not
know, he does not eat,”138 business entities often prefer their familiar national law as opposed to the unfamiliar CISG notwithstanding that the CISG‟s provisions might be more appropriate to
international contracts of sale.
Apropos of international contracts of sale, the CISG can only
unify a small part of contract law because according to CISG Article 1(1), its application is restricted to contracts for the international sale of goods. Outside sale contracts, the CIGS does not
cover various other areas of law including non-contract law,
transfer of property law or unjust enrichment. The attempt for a
comprehensive and global unification of contract law is perhaps
too ambitious139 but, at least within the EU, it is desirable for the
projects of harmonization to not be limited to contracts of sale.
Instead, these projects must aim to ensure the functioning of all
sectors of the EU‟s single market, including the free movement of
capital, labor, goods and services as named in Article 26 of the

note 12.
138 Translation of the German proverb, “Was der Bauer nicht kennt, das
frisst er nicht.” Cf. Eckart Brödermann, The Practice of Excluding the CISG:
Time for Change?, Address at the Modern Law for Global Commerce: Congress
to Celebrate the Fortieth Annual Season of UNCITRAL (July 9-12, 2007) (humorously describing that the main reason to exclude the CISG is a lack of knowledge, and expressing hope that this will change soon), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Broedermann-rev.pdf.
See also
Martin F. Koehler & Guo Yujun, The Acceptance of the Unified Sales Law
(CISG) in Different Legal Systems: an International Comparison of Three Surveys on the Exclusion of the CISG’s Application Conducted in the United States,
Germany and China, 20 PACE INTL. L. REV. 45, 60 (2008) (reciting the analogous
proverb "the devil you know is better than the devil you don't know"), available
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/koehler-yujun.html
139 However, with regard to commercial contracts, the UNIDROIT Principles
are a successful step in that direction. See Int‟l Institute for the Unification of
Private Law, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(2004), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/integralversi
onprinciples2004-e.pdf. But compared to the CISG, the UNIDROIT principles
are not autonomous directly applicable laws. Their application depends on the
parties‟ choice, or at least an arbitrator‟s preference. Cf. Hans Van Houtte, The
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 11 ARB. INT‟L.
373, 378 (1995).
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Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).140
The UK‟s ratification of the CISG, currently long overdue,
will eventually take effect and constitute a step towards the
process of harmonization of European contract law. The above
analysis shows that neither the general rules on statutory interpretation set out in Article 7 of the CISG, nor Article 7‟s fairly restrictive reference to good faith, should deter the UK from ratifying the Convention. To the contrary, once the UK ratifies the
CISG, jurisprudence thereon by the highly regarded English
courts might increase the CISG‟s acceptance within the international business community. As stated by the CISG opponent, Derek Whitley (Queen‟s Counsel), English judges “are so highly regarded that of cases heard in the Commercial Court . . . nearly 30
per cent of all the cases had no English litigant at all.”141 Hopefully, once the UK adopts the CISG, the remaining noncontracting states within the EU142 will follow.
II. LESSONS LEARNED: HURDLES ON THE WAY TO SUCCESS FOR THE
COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE
Recalling the article on legal diversity being one of the obstacles to economic growth within the European Union by Germany‟s former chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, cited in the introduction,143 one should not forget that transnational transactions
within the EU take place within a single market. In fact,
“[w]ithin the European single market, people, goods, services and
money move around as freely as within one country . . . . Although we now take it for granted, the single market is one of the

140 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, 2008 O.J. (C115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. On December 1 2009, the Treaty
of Lisbon, 2007 O.J. (C 307) 01, entered into force, amending the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty on European Union. The
changes are reflected in the TFEU and the Consolidated Version of the Treaty
on European Union, 2008 O.J. (C115) 13 [hereinafter TEU].
141 Wheatley, supra note 134, at 31, for whom the high number of cases with
foreign litigants heard by the English Commercial Court proves the high reputation of English judges. Different from the author of this article, Derek Wheatley
fears that a ratification of the CISG by the UK would imperil the “tremendous
accolade for English law and English justice.” Id.
142 Ireland, Portugal and Malta.
143 See generally Schröder, supra note 1.
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EU‟s greatest achievements.”144
This single market, enabled by the Single European Act of
1986 and launched in 1993,145 is certainly a great achievement
because it has undoubtedly brought major benefits to businesses,
consumers and employees alike.146 Nevertheless, the single market cannot by itself be considered complete. There are remaining
obstacles that continue to prevent people, goods, services and
money from moving around “as freely as . . . within one country”147 due to the lack of harmonized contract law in the EU. As
more Europeans living in different countries engage in crossborder purchases and transactions, the legal diversity in Europe
appears increasingly antiquated.148 This alone was enough for
Gerhard Schröder and the former German government “to support and actively assist the Commission with its Action Plan on „A
More Coherent European Contract Law.‟”149 By “Action Plan”
Gerhard Schröder refers to the communication by the EU Commission from 2003,150 which encourages discussion and research
on European contract law in order to prepare a “Common Frame
of Reference.”151 This Common Frame of Reference (“CFR”) is not
completed yet. Currently there is only an academic draft, referred to as the Draft Common Frame of Reference (“DCFR” or
“the Draft”). Following the Commission‟s Action Plan, several
study and research groups152 have joined forces and prepared the
See EUROPA: Activities of the European Union: Internal Market,
http://europa.eu/pol/singl/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2010) [hereinafter
EUROPA].
145 See EUROPA, European Commission, The EU Single Market: Historical
Overview, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/top_layer/index_2_en.htm (last
visited Feb. 17, 2010).
146 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), EU Single Market
– Introduction, http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/europeandtrade/europe/singlemarket/page45642.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
147 EUROPA, supra note 144.
148 See Jochen Zenthöfer, Brauchen wir ein europäisches Zivilgesetzbuch? [Do
we need a European Civil Code?], in HUMBOLDT FORUM RECHT 40, 43 (1999),
available at http://www.humboldt-forum-recht.de/deutsch/4-1999/ beitrag.html.
149 Schröder, supra note 1, at 5.
150 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, A MORE COHERENT
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: AN ACTION PLAN (2003), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/com_2
003_68_en.pdf.
151 See id. at 16.
152 Participating study and research groups: Study Group on a European Civ144
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DCFR, which at this stage, contains only legal rules which are
later to be supplemented by explanations, comparative analyses
and examples.153 An interim edition of the DCFR, available only
in English,154 has been communicated to the Commission and was
published in 2008.155
The DCFR is partly based on the Principles of European Contract Law156 (“PECL”) which were prepared by the Commission on
European Contract Law (also known as “Lando Commission,”
named after its founder Ole Lando), whose successor is the Study
Group.157 In contrast to PECL, the coverage of the DCFR is much
wider. Specifically, the PECL contains rules “on the formation,
validity, interpretation and contents of contracts” as well as “on
the performance of obligations.” PECL further provides for remedies for the non-performance of contractual obligations. However,
the DCFR also covers so-called “specific contracts,”158 as well as
non-contractual obligations arising as the result of unjustified
enrichment.159 The final edition of the DCFR, as opposed to the
interim edition of 2008, will even cover some matters of movable

il Code (Study Group), Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (Acquis
Group), Project Group on the Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law
(Insurance Group), Association Henri Capitant, Société des Législation Comparée, Conseil supérieur du Notariat, Common Core Group, Research Group on
the Economic Assessment of Contract Law Rules (Economic Impact Group), Data Base Group, Europäische Rechtsakademie (ERA).
153 See Stefan Leible, Europäisches Privatrecht am Scheideweg, 35 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENZEITSCHRIFT 2558, 2560 (2008) (F.R.G.).
154 Although translations are desirable to encourage an early involvement of
the public in the discussion, the Commission is apparently not willing to arrange
for translations at this stage. This is because the academic DCFR is considerably
longer than what the Commission intends to publish as the final CFR. See Remarks of Ms. Kuneva, EUR. PARL. DEB. (O-0072/2008) (Sept. 1, 2008),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=
20080901&secondRef=ITEM-022&language=EN.
155 Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) Interim Outline Edition (Christian von
Bar et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter DCFR], available at http://webh01.
ua.ac.be/storme/DCFRInterim.pdf. All references made herein to articles of the
DCFR refer to this interim edition, being the most current available version of
the Draft.
156 Id. at 24.
157 Study Group on a European Civil Code, SCOPE, http://www.sgecc.net/ pages/en/introduction/101.scope.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2009).
158 DCFR, supra note 154, at 18-19.
159 Id. at 19.
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property law.160
While intended to serve as an independent document, the
DCFR is larger than what will be the final CFR as envisaged by
the European Commission.161 The final CFR is supposed to have
two main purposes. First, it shall operate as a toolbox for European legislators (Commission, Council and European Parliament)
for the revision and preparation of EU legislation (regulations, directives) in the area of contract law.162 The same holds true for
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and national courts faced
with the task to interpret such legislation or national law based
on European legislation.163 Second, the CFR might operate as an
optional instrument - a set of legal rules which the parties may
choose to govern their contractual relations.
The final part of this essay concerns the CFR as a toolbox to
help interpret European legislation in the area of contract law
and as the basis for the so-called optional instrument. Some aspects of the analysis conducted in Part I of this essay, notably
concerning the UK‟s position on the principle of good faith, will
help to identify possible shortcomings of the CFR in its current
draft version. Suffice it to note that if the CFR is intended to
serve as an optional instrument, its content needs to be accepted
by both civil and common law parties. Therefore, if one of the
parties to the CFR has an English legal background, the question
presented is whether or not the CFR can be a viable option.
A. Demands on Interpretation of European Uniform Law – the
CFR as a Toolbox
An increasing proportion of the law applicable in the EU
member states is harmonized by European Community Private
Law, which is based on regulations and directives.164 However,
only some aspects of contract law are covered by European directives and regulations. “Islands of European law within a sea of
Id.
Id.
162 See
EUROPA,
Consumer
Affairs,
European
Contract
Law,
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/index_
en.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2009) (summarizing the purpose of the CFR).
163 See Leible, supra note 153, at 2561.
164 5 FRANZ-JÜRGEN SÄCKER, MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB, para.196
(Kurt Rebmann, Roland Rixecker & Franz-Jürgen Säcker eds., 2006) (F.R.G.).
160
161
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national legal rules”165 is a popular metaphor to describe the
fragmentary character of European Community Private Law.166
For instance, the following European directives already harmonized some areas of contract law in Europe: the Package Travel
Directive,167 the Distance Selling Directive,168 the Unfair Contracts Terms Directive,169 and the Timeshare Directive.170 As this
enumeration shows, harmonized European Community Private
Law mainly covers questions of consumer protection while business to business contracts are to a great extent unaffected by
these directives.
Due to the fragmentary character of directives and regulations in the field of European Community Private Law, there are
numerous interactions between national laws governing the largest part of contract law in Europe, and European directives and
regulations. These interactions pose certain difficulties to national courts and to the ECJ when ruling on the interpretation
and application of the directives and regulations in different national contexts.
When interpreting Article 7 of the CISG, it is required that
regard be given to its international character along with the need

165 See Hans-Werner Eckert, Europäisierung des Privatrechts – Die Bedeutung der Richtlinien der Europäischen Union für die Schaffung einer einheitlichen Rechtsordnung [Europeanization of Private Law – The Importance of European Union Directives for the Creation of a Uniform Legal System], in
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ALFRED SÖLLNER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG - EUROPAS UNIVERSALE
RECHTSORDNUNGSPOLITISCHE AUFGABE IM RECHT DES DRITTEN JAHRTAUSENDS 240
(Gerhard Köbler, Meinhard Heinze & Wolfgang Hromadka eds., 2000) (F.R.G.).
166 See Säcker, supra note 164, paras. 196, 212.
167 Council Directive 90/314/EEC, On Package Travel, Package Holidays and
Package Tours, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 59, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31990L0314:EN:NOT.
168 European Parliament and Council Directive 97/7/EC, On the Protection of
Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
31997L0007:EN:NOT.
169 Council Directive 93/13/EEC, On Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts,
1993 O.J. (L 95) 29, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993L0013: EN:NOT.
170 Council Directive 94/47/EC, On the Protection of Purchasers in Respect of
Certain Aspects of Contracts Relating to the Purchase of the Right to Use Immovable Properties on a Timeshare Basis, 1994 O.J. (L 280) 83, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994
L0047:EN:NOT.
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to promote uniformity in its application.171 The European Community Private Law, or national law based thereon, requires
quite similarly that the Law is interpreted by retaining its European character and the need for a uniform application within the
EU. Therefore, any interpretation of European directives and
regulations in the area of contract law should not be constrained
by the national legal background in which they are applied. Instead, the interpretation should be based on the acquis of contract
law within the EU, meaning the existing EU private law in other
directives and regulations.172 Furthermore, the interpretation
may also be based on what can be described as the “common core”
of the national contract laws of the member states.173
The CFR, which is based on the academic DCFR, collects,
consolidates, and presents the acquis (the existing EU private
law) and the common principles of the member states‟ contract
laws in one single publication. It can, therefore, serve as a very
valuable tool in assisting national and European courts to interpret and apply European directives and regulations. However, the
academic DCFR is not restricted to issues on which there is common ground within the EU. Many rules contained therein constitute either a compromise or reflect simply what has been considered as the most appropriate or desirable rule by the scholars
who participated in the Draft. Judges who base an interpretation
of EU legislation on such rules might face criticism from lawyers
from jurisdictions that do not agree with the “compromise” or
“most appropriate rule” of the DCFR. Many controversial rules in
the DCFR will certainly be subject to further discussions within
the legal and business community, including the various rules referencing the principle of good faith,174 a principle which, according to the European common law jurisdictions of England and

See supra Part I.B.1.
Research conducted by the Acquis Group has greatly influenced the
DCFR. See Aquis Group, European
Research Group on Existing EC Private Law, http://www.acquis-group.org (last
visited Nov. 12, 2009).
173 The Common Core Group‟s research focuses on finding the similarities
between the contract laws of different EU jurisdictions. International University College of Turin, The Common Core of European Private Law, The Project,
Approach, http://www.common-core.org (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
174 See infra Part II.B.
171
172
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Wales, is not likely to be accepted without objection.175
To ensure that the rules contained in the final CFR have sufficient authority to serve as an accepted tool of interpretation, it
is desirable that a representative number of lawyers, interest
groups, and business people of all jurisdictions within the EU become actively involved in the discussion and preparation of the
CFR. The academic DCFR should serve as the basis and the
starting point of such discussion. However, it is unclear whether
such broad participation will be achieved because the task of raising enough interest for the process of harmonizing European contract law seems far from being accomplished. Even in the presence of sufficient interest within all member states, language
impediment serves as one obstacle because the lack of translated
DCFR versions will likely hinder involvement by some of the concerned or interested parties.176
B. Good Faith in the CFR - The Optional Instrument a Real
Option?
If the CFR was to serve not only as a tool box but also as an
optional instrument, meaning a set of contract law rules which
the parties may choose to govern their contractual relations, there
is an even greater need for early participation of all groups concerned. Notably, involvement by business entities is particularly
important for the CFR to be successful as an optional instrument.
Unlike the CISG, the success of the CFR as an optional instrument depends entirely on the acceptance and awareness of the
business community. If businesses are not familiar with the
CISG or convinced by its provisions, then this may cause the fairly common practice of opting-out by excluding the CISG‟s applicability by virtue of the CISG Article 6.177 Nevertheless, the CISG
is still of relative importance because it is autonomously applicable to international sales contracts whenever the parties fail to
exclude it.
In contrast, if the CFR is to serve as an optional instrument,
it will not apply autonomously but only if the parties “opt in.” At
least in the near future the “opt-in model” seems to be the only
175
176
177

See supra Part I.B.2.b.
Kuneva, supra note 154.
See supra Part I.C.
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feasible choice. In contrast, an “opt-out model” would mean that
the CFR would replace national law if the parties do not expressly
opt out of it in the choice of law provisions included in their contracts. First, this would raise difficult questions of competence by
the European Community as it relates to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality178 outlined in Article 5 of the new
Treaty on European Union (“TEU”).179 While harmonized or
common contract law may be practical and desirable to facilitate
the common market, it is not particularly necessary because thus
far individual member states were capable of resolving their contract law issues. Second, the CFR would, if applicable on an optout basis, overlap with the CISG. Finally, an “opt-out model”
comes very close to the idea of a European civil law code which
currently has too many opponents.180 As it currently stands,
there are better arguments to support the “opt-in model,” which
respects party autonomy to the greatest extent.181 However, the
“opt-in model” means that the application of the CFR would be restricted to cases of the parties‟ choice and the CFR would not apply autonomously without a choice-of-law clause. Therefore the
“opt-in model” would result in the CFR having a similar legal status as the Uniform Laws in the UK.182 Any lack of familiarity of
the business community with the CFR would entirely diminish its
impact, since the parties are not likely to make an active choice
for an instrument the parties are unfamiliar with.
The European business community not only needs to be familiar with the CFR for it to be a success, but the provisions of
the CFR also need to be acceptable for parties of different legal
backgrounds. This is doubtful, because if the DCFR‟s provisions
on good faith were included in the final CFR they might be subject to a lot of controversy. Due to the diverging opinions on the
benefits of a codified good faith principle, the CISG is restricted
See Karen Battersby, Opt In? Opt Out? Presentation at Nottingham Law
School,
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/
cont_law/stakeholders/5-10.pdf.
179 See sources cited supra note 140.
180 Joachim Jahn, Rettet das BGB vor Brüssel [Save the German Civil Code
from Brussels], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Oct. 10, 2006 (F.R.G.).
181 Stefan Leible, Was tun mit dem Gemeinsamen Referenzrahmen für das
Europäische Vertragsrecht? - Plädoyer für ein optionales Instrument, 28
BETRIEBS BERATER 1469, 1473 (2008) (F.R.G.).
182 See supra Part I.A.
178
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by its single reference to good faith found in Article 7 on interpretation of the Convention. By contrast, the DCFR contains approximately forty references to good faith and fair dealing scattered
throughout its provisions.
Similar to Article 7 of the CISG, Article I.-1:102 of the DCFR
provides that in the interpretation and development of its provisions, “regard should be had to the need to promote: (a) uniformity
of application; (b) good faith and fair dealing; and (c) legal certainty.” As analyzed, a reference to good faith in a provision concerning statutory interpretation is not generally problematic if it
is correctly applied to interpretation questions.183 On the other
hand, considering that Article 7 of the CISG has given rise to
some diverging decisions,184 the same might be the fate of the similar Article I.-1:102 of the DCFR. Foreseeing the risk of diverging
decisions, the drafters of the DCFR included the principle of “legal certainty” in letter c of the Article. Still, the question of what
shall prevail, “good faith and fair dealing” or “legal certainty,”
remains open.
Moreover, the DCFR‟s good faith principle is far more extensive than that of the CISG. For example, good faith is supposed
to be respected when it comes to the parties‟ autonomy to conclude contracts (Article II.-1:102 (1) DCFR), it applies to precontractual negotiations and creates pre-contractual duties (Article II.-3.301 DCFR), it is part of the DCFR‟s concepts of mistake
(Article II.-7.201 (1)(b)(ii) DCFR) and fraud (Article II.-7:205(1)
DCFR). Furthermore, courts may adapt contracts according to
the requirements of good faith and fair dealing (Article II.7:207(2) DCFR), and contracts have to be interpreted in light of
the good faith principle (Article II.-8:102 (1)(g) DCFR), which allows courts to include additional implied terms.
There is also a general duty for the contracting parties to act
in good faith in almost every situation stipulated by Article III. –
1:103 (1) of the DCFR. Under this provision, “[a] person has a duty to act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in performing an obligation, in exercising a right to performance, in pursuing or defending a remedy for non-performance, or in exercising
a right to terminate an obligation or contractual relationship.”

183
184

See supra Part I.B.2.c.
See supra Part I.B.2.c.; see cases cited supra notes 127-28.
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According to subsection (2) of this provision, the contracting parties may not exclude or limit the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In case of breach, the party not acting in good faith is barred
under subsection (3) from exercising its rights.
While most of these applications of the good faith principle
are familiar to a German lawyer,185 they are very likely to be an
obstacle to the acceptance of the DCFR by English lawyers.186
Moreover, English lawyers would understandably inquire about
the necessity of including vague terms such as “good faith and fair
dealing”. Most applications of the good faith principle could be
described more precisely without referencing the term “good
faith” given the term‟s unclear meaning.
Even providing a “definition” of good faith and fair dealing
does not eliminate the uncertainty arising from the vast overuse
of the term “good faith.” For instance, Annex 1 to the DCFR provides: “Good faith and fair dealing refers to an objective standard
of conduct. „Good faith‟ on its own may refer to a subjective mental attitude, often characterized by an absence of knowledge of
something which, if known, would adversely affect the morality of
what is done.”187
Most lawyers would agree that it is not only difficult but perhaps impossible to define “good faith.” Even though the drafters
of the DCFR made a good effort in their attempt to define this vague term, the definition remains somewhat incomplete. To help
define “good faith,” the definition in Annex 1 to the DCFR just
cited includes yet more vague terms such as “morality.” To help
illustrate the dilemma with the attempts to define “good faith,” it
is instructive to quote the German author, Johann Wolfgang von
Goethe, who wrote: “And here I stand, with all my lore, Poor fool,
no wiser than before.”188

See supra Part I.B.2.a.
See supra Part I.B.2.b.
187 DCFR, supra note 155, at 338.
188 Translated from the original German text: “Da steh’ ich nun, ich armer
Thor! Und bin so klug als wie zuvor.” JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, FAUST,
EINE TRAGÖDIE [FAUST, THE FIRST PART OF THE TRAGEDY], ch. 1 Nacht [Night] (K.
H.
Hucke
ed.,
Aschendorff
2008)
(1808),
available
at
http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/ 21000 (e-book to download), translation available at http://www.gutenberg. org/etext/14591 (e-book to download, Bayard Taylor
trans.).
185
186
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CONCLUSION
The greatest difficulty that projects from contract law harmonization is finding the balance between the need for legal clarity and the need for flexible solutions where precise rules lead to
unjust results. Discussions about the benefits of the good faith
principle usually attempt to resolve this difficulty. While most
lawyers of civil law jurisdictions, particularly lawyers from German legal systems, are more familiar with and open towards the
good faith principle, lawyers from common law countries, especially English lawyers, tend to prefer clear rules over any vague
good faith provisions. By including a principle of good faith in Article 7, the CISG‟s attempt was to find compromise between these
varying views, while at the same time, restricting its application
to matters of construction of the Convention‟s provisions. The
DCFR on the other hand does not contain a similar compromise
but instead contains a clear choice for the good faith principle
with all its possible applications. This choice is not surprising
when considering that the majority of the DCFR drafters are from
civil law jurisdictions. The importance of good faith and fair dealing as emphasized in the DCFR is nearly equivalent to the importance of the principle of good faith (Treu und Glauben) under
German law.
With such a far reaching notion of good faith, the final CFR
could not be successful as an optional instrument. It is difficult to
imagine that businesses or lawyers from the UK would be choosing the CFR as the law governing individual contracts if the CFR
contained the DCFR‟s extensive references to good faith and fair
dealing. Moreover, under the DCFR, courts have a large discretionary authority while party autonomy is to a great extent limited by the principle of good faith and fair dealing. Limiting
party autonomy appears problematic within the context of international business contracts.189
Lastly, the CISG‟s tendency to compromise has also caused
interpretative problems and diverging decisions. Nevertheless,
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given that worldwide legal systems, including the European Union differ remarkably, compromises are often the only building
blocks for projects of contract law harmonization. Although the
DCFR has not been sufficiently discussed by European lawyers
and businesses, it is already anticipated that additional compromises will have to be made before the final CFR can become a
successful optional instrument. Under the current state of flux
encapsulating the DCFR, it is unlikely that its various references
to good faith and fair dealing will survive in its finalized form.
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